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Some well-known correlations between R&D and performance are given a somewhat new interpretation in
this paper. I present an alternative model of knowledge accumulation, with some interesting and desirable
properties. Perhaps the most attractive property is that it provides a simple and less data intensive
framework for empirical studies of the relationship between firm performance and R&D. This property
allows me to address some new aspects of this relationship combining two rich, new sources of firm and
plant-level data. Among the substantial empirical findings are (i) R&D has a positive and significant effect on
performance, (ii) the estimates suggest that the appropriable part of knowledge capital depreciate at a rate
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the relationship between R&D and firm performance using an unusually
rich set of firm-level data. The data set allows us study this relationship at the line-of-business
level within each firm'. This study also examines the extent to which knowledge can be produc-
tively transferred from one activity to another. The idea that knowledge gives rise to economies
of scope has recently been emphasized by Jovanovic (1993). He explores to what extent this
idea can explain the observed pattern of increasing diversification of U.S. firms. In contrast to
most of the literature on corporate structure, which has emphasized the links between corpo-
rate structure and financial issues such as capital market imperfections 2 , his analysis identifies
interesting links between real effects and corporate structure. The current paper pursues a view
similar to Jovanovic's, in that it identifies real (spillover) effects along borders defined by the
corporate structure. The importance of scope economies in knowledge production has recently
also been a focus of the growth literature. Such scope economies have been identified as an en-
gine of economic growth in papers by Stokey (1988), Young (1991) and Lucas (1993). Whereas
the importance of scope economies in knowledge production is well recognized, little is known
about their empirical significance. This paper provides some direct, empirical evidence on this
phenomenon.
In addition to identifying R&D at the line-of-business level within each firm, my data set also
identifies which firm belongs to the same "interlocking group of firms" 3 . The R&D data have
been merged to production data at the plant level. The merged data set is used to study the
impact of R&D along various dimensions. The parameter estimates reveal significant spillover
effects across different lines-of-business within a firm. Significant spillovers are also identified
for activities, within a line of business, that are carried out by different firms within the same
interlocking group.
These findings are obtained by a new framework for using raicrodata to study the relation-
ship between R&D and performance. This framework should be useful beyond the application
presented here. The framework explicitly recognizes the importance of heterogeneity between
'Previously, analysis at comparable level of detail has to my knowledge been presented only by Lichtenberg
and Siegel (1991). An advantage of my data set is that the R&D data are disaggregated to the line-of-business
level (like the production data). This is an advantage in comparison to the data set used by Lichtenberg and
Siegel, in which only the production data were disaggregated to the line-of-business level.
2 See e.g. Gertner, Sharfstein and Stein (1993).
. 3The Norwegian term is "konsern". An interlocking group of firms is characterized by a parent-company and
all subsidiaries in which the parent owns a majority share of equity.
firms in terms of production costs and product characteristics (within narrowly defined indus-
tries). The model is consistent with the existence of market power, quasi-fixed physical capital
and scale economies in production.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the empirical framework presented in this paper is the
alternative specification of knowledge production. In what has become the standard model for
empirical analysis of the relationship between R&D and performance!, knowledge accumulation
is treated symmetrically to the accumulation of physical capital (as modelled in the "perpetual
inventory model"). This treatment of knowledge accumulation is critized in the next section. The
alternative specification of knowledge accumulation, presented in this paper, not only overcomes
some of this critiscm, but it also provides a simpler and less data-demanding empirical model.
In particular, the (dynamic) estimating equation requires only a single cross section of the R&D
variables. This is very useful for the empirical analysis presented below, as my R&D data set
is only available for a single cross-section. The estimating model is nevertheless fully consistent
with a situation in which there are substantial and persistent differences in performance between
firms. In fact, one of the main ideas of the model is that differences in know-how give rise to
such a pattern. Know-how can not be directly observed, but is treated as a latent variable which
(possibly) depreciates over time. However, we observe R&D effort which is assumed to increase
know-how in a stochastic sense. We can therefore observe a determinant of changes in know-how
(with noise added). As I argue below, the model might be labeled "a not-so-ked effect" model,
as it resembles the "fixed effect" (or correlated effect) model introduced into the production
function literature by Mundlak (1961) and Mundlak and Hoch (1965). But the effects - the
productivity differences between firms - are not fixed over time, but tend to be less and less
fixed (that is; correlated) as we consider periods further and further apart.
The analysis presented in the next section points out the deficiencies of the perpetual in-
ventory model as a model of knowledge accumulation. One of the properties of my alternative
model is that it is consistent with the observed pattern that R&D effort tends to be a reinforcing
process. It is widely recognized that there are large differences in the R&D effort across firms
within narrowly defined industries 5 , and that these differences in R&D effort are persistent over
time6. Nelson (1988) has emphasized that the "standard model" does not capture this phe-
nomenon of the coexistence of "innovators" and "imitators". In the alternative specification,
4 What I refer to as the standard model has been spelled out and discussed in much detail in Griliches (1979).
Se also Griliches (1986).
5 See Bound et al. (1984), Klette (1992) and Schankerman and Pakes (1984).
6 Hall, Griliches and Hausman (1986).
4
such an outcome is modeled as a consequence of the stochastic nature of knowledge production
in combination with a positive feedback from past R&D success to the productiveness of current
R&D. In other words, the model captures a situation where a lucky strike in previous R&D has
a positive impact on the incentives to increase subsequent R&D effort.
The paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 contrasts some properties of the "perpetual
inventory model" as a model of knowledge accumulation with the alternative model applied in
this paper. Section 3 displays the empirical model. The data set is presented in section 4.
Econometric issues are discussed in section 5. Section 6 exhibits the empirical results. I give
some concluding remarks in section 7
2 A criticism of the standard model
The standard framework for econometric analysis of the relationship between R&D, profits and
productivity was presented in Griliches (1979). Mairesse and Sassenou (1991) have surveyed
empirical studies in this tradition. Essentially, the model treats the accumulation of knowledge
capital in the same way as that of physical capital. However, some of the peculiarities of
knowledge accumulation have been recognized. In some studies, knowledge capital is recognized
to be a partially non-excludable good, so that spillovers across firms are taken into consideration.
Jaffe (1986) and others have carried out empirical analyses of this aspect of knowledge capital.
Griliches (1979,1992) discussed the findings and problems of such studies of knowledge spillovers.
The point I want to emphasize here is that the excludable part of knowledge capital is treated
in the same way as ordinary capital.
The particular aspect of the standard model on which I focus is the form of the capital
accumulation equation for knowledge:
Kt
 = Kt_i(1 - 6) + Rt-i. (1)
This is the "perpetual inventory" model of capital accumulation widely used in neoclassical
capital theory. The lag between R&D investment (Rt_ 1 ) and the arrival of new knowledge
capital (Kt ) is assumed to be one year here, but that is not important. The important aspect of
this formulation is the assumption of perfect substitutability between new R&D investment and
old knowledge. This property implies that cet.par. a firm with more initial knowledge capital
in a given period will carry out less R&D investment. Such a negative correlation runs counter
to the well-established fact that differences in R&D investment between firms (within a given
industry) tend to be highly positively correlated over time. That is, there is a widely observed
pattern that firms which carried out an above average amount of R&D last year will also tend
to do so this year and vice versa.
To clarify my point and ease the comparison with the alternative model I will consider below,
it is useful to present this argument in a formal way. The firm maximizes its net present value;
V(K) , given its initial knowledge capital stock (Kt ):
00
vt(Kt). max > Osfr(K) — wt-FsRt+s), 	 (2)
{Rti- s } s.o
subject to the accumulation equation (1). )3 is the discount factor, rt (Kt ) is the short run profit
function conditional on the knowledge capital stock, excluding R&D investment cost, while 1/4
is the unit cost of R&D investment. For convenience, I have not included other kinds of capital
or uncertainty in the model. This can be easily done without changing the argument; it only
involves more notation.
As shown for instance by Lucas and Stokey (1989, ch. 4), under mild regularity conditions
the value function satisfies the Bellman-equation:
V(Kt) mr[rt(Kt) wtRt + OVt+i(Kt(1 — 45) Ra)]. 	 (3)
Assuming strict concavity of the short run profit function (in Kt ), the optimal R&D investment
(Rik) must satisfy the first-order condition7 :
wt 01744 (Kt(1— 5) + 14) =	 (4)
If we consider two firms which differ only in their knowledge capital stocks (by an amount dKt ),
it follows from this first-order condition that
0 111-10 (diCt( 1— b) -F dli7) = O.
That is, clitIldKt = —(1—.5), if V" is not zero. This can be restated
Kt
kit 	1 - 45) 1V;'
7 Lucas and Stokey (1989, di. 4) show that if the short run profit function is strictly concave in the state
variable, so is the value function. Consequently, strict concavity of the profit function is necessary for the model




' where a hat above an expression denote the logarithmic derivative; e.g. /i; = 	 As
anticipated, this analysis shows that there is a simple negative relationship between optimal
R&D investment and the initial knowledge capital stock (Ks), if we start with an accumulation
equation like (1).
The relationship suggests that we should observe a pattern of negative autocorrelation in
log(Rt), or equivalently, a negative correlation between log(R t) and the log of the knowledge
capital stock. Such an autocorrelation pattern runs contrary to the observed pattern8 , which
reinforces the doubt one might have about the appropriateness of (1) as an adequate formulation
of knowledge accumulation. Some might argue that this exercise is too simple and that in
reality there are other unobservable factors that offset this implication of the model. That is
to say, the cet.par. claim made above is uninteresting. Ockham's razor provides the obvious
counterargument: It is more satisfactory to search for a self-contained story more consistent with
the basic facts, than to rely on unobservables which counter the unsatisfactory implications
of the model. At least, Ockham's criterion is persuasive if the alternative, more consistent
model provides an equally simple framework for analysis. As we shall see, the alternative
model presented below offers a framework that is, in several respects, even simpler to implement
empirically than the standard model.
2.1 An alternative model of knowledge accumulation
There is an alternative to the perpetual inventory model of capital accumulation that suggests
that old capital and new investment are not perfect substitutes. The idea is that initial knowledge
capital stock might have a positive effect on the incentives to carry out R&D. A similar effect, in
the context of physical investment, was pointed out by Penrose (1959), and examined formally
by Uzawa (1968). Hall and Hayashi (1987) and Romer (1990) have considered similar models in
the context of knowledge accumulation. Griliches (1979) also suggests that such a formulation
could be preferable. The basic idea is that greater initial knowledge will tend to increase the
amount of knowledge obtained from a given amount of R&D.
Formally, the knowledge production function takes the form:
Kt+1 = G(Kt, Rt)
	
(7)
with the (standard production function) properties that GK > 0,
 GR
 > 0, G KR > 0 while
8 See e.g. Hall, Griliches and Hausman (1986).
7
GKK < 0 and GRR < 0). The subscripts denote the partial derivatives. Furthermore, in this
theoretical section, I assume that G(-) is linear homogeneous, as is done by Uzawa (1968) and
Hall and Hayashi (1987), but not by Romer (1990). The assumption of linear homogeneity in
the knowledge production function will be relaxed in the empirical section. Notice that the
standard model satisfies all these assumptions, except that in the standard case GKR = O. It is
the sharp inequality in this cross-derivative that will alter the implications of the model, as we
shall see below, and that corresponds to the assumption of less-than-perfect substitutes between
old and new capital.
It follows from the stated assumptions that Kt-Fi = KtG(1, R/ K) ===. Ktg(Rt1 Kt), where
g' > 0 and g" < O.
The first-order condition from the Bellman equation, similar to equation (4), can in this case
be written:
— tvt	 i@Vti+1(Ktg(RVICt)) AR/Kt) = O.	 (8)
Notice that the argument in the value function is changed according to the more general accu-
mulation equation (7). Equation (8) can be rewritten:
1n[Vt1-1-1(Ktg( 14/Kt))] ln[gi(letK /Kt)] = in(wth3 )-	 (9)
By totally differentiating this equation with respect to Kt and
 R, we find that
Ktgva l
	. Rat'?	 kt)) R:g"	 -+  	 Kt) 
= O . 	(10)Ktg'Ktg
As before, a hat above an expression denotes the logarithmic derivative. The arguments of
the value function and the g-function have been dropped for notational convenience. Denote
—(Ktg1744 )/V1+1 by w. w is a measure of the concavity of the value function, and consequently
is determined by the concavity of the profit function. ca is non-negative if the value function is





where I have also introduced A E-_--
 (R;g")/(Ktg') — w(R;g')/(Ktg). With a linear value function
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(co = 0), there is clearly a positive relationship between k and kt 9 .
In the special case considered by Hall and Hayashi (1987), where G(Rt , Kt) = , it is
easy to show that A = v - 1 - vw. It follows that 1 + w/A = (1 - wu - 0 -1 (1 - 0(1 w), which
is positive if co is below unity, i.e. the value function is not too concave. In this case there is
also a positive relationship between k and kt.
More generally, the sign of
 i-/kt depends on whether u.) -I- A = w[1 - g' (Ktg)]
gll (Kt?) is positive or negative. This sign is determined by the concavity of the value
function, as well as the properties of the g-function up to its second derivative.
To summarize, the model of accumulation considered in this section suggests that the initial
knowledge capital stock, that is, past R&D, may be positively related to the amount of current
R&D investment, in contrast to the standard ("perpetual inventory") model. But the model
does not unambiguously imply a positive relationship between past and current R&D, as this
relationship depends on the shape of the value function and the knowledge production function
(GO). The point I want to make is that the model does not per se have the counterfactual
implications of the standard model. In the empirical model to be presented below, I will elaborate
on the specification of the knowledge production function.
2.2 On knowledge depreciation
The social value of knowledge capital can depreciate because of obsolescence. When we consider
the private value of knowledge capital, where the focus is on the appropriable part of the
knowledge stock relative to the firm's competitors, knowledge capital will also depreciate because
competing firms imitate the ideas of an innovative firmw. In empirical studies of R&D it is not
the absolute amount of knowledge capital which matters, but the relative amount of knowledge
compared to the other firms in the sample.
The point to note is that the standard model has not been able to empirically identify the
depreciation rate, either in absolute or relative terms. Indeed, Mairesse and Sassenou (1991)
and Hall and Mairesse (1993) have pointed out that the parameter estimates of the impact of
the knowledge capital stock on productivity is insensitive to the choice of the depreciation rate.
This result has the troublesome implication that the estimated net private rate of return to
R&D, based on the coefficients from such regressions, are very sensitive to the assumption one
9 Nothing in the derivation of (11) hinges on GKR being strictly positive. It is a simple exercise to show that
(11) is reduced to (6) when the knowledge production function is of the "perpetual inventory" form (1).
10 Schankerman and Pakes (1984) discuss this issue.
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makes about the depreciation rate. Considerable attention is paid to such estimates of rates of
return to knowledge capital. Hence, it is desirable to obtain a model that does not rely heavily
on outside and largely unavailable parameter estimates in order to identify the rate of return to
knowledge capital and related variables of interest.
Unlike the standard model, the empirical model to be estimated below has the advantage that
it is able to identify the depreciation rate of the appropriable part of the knowledge stock. That
is, I will estimate cet.par. the speed of convergence towards the average firm for a firm which
starts with, say, an above average knowledge stock. As will be shown, this is the depreciation
rate that is required to estimate the value of the knowledge capital stock and the rate of return
to this kind of capital.
3 The basic empirical model
3.1 The model of short-run producer-behavior
This section presents the applied framework for short run producer behavior, which is a hybrid of
non-parametric productivity-analysis and an ordinary production-function". In Klette (1993), I
have presented a detailed derivation of the model. A brief summary of the derivation is given in
appendix A. The model is based on the assumption of short-run profit-maximizing behavior, and
allow for scale economies and imperfect competition in the output market. The ordinary capital
stock is assumed to be (quasi-) fixed when the firm solves its short-run profit-maximization
problem.
Although the unit of observation in the empirical section is a plant, it is still convenient
to term the decision making unit the firm rather than the plant at this stage. The distinction
between the model for the plant and that for the firm will be introduced later. The treatment
of knowledge capital will also be discussed below.
In solving the short-run profit-maximization problem, the firm chooses the amount of labour
and materials, and sets the output price. The formal expression of the model is (cf. appendix
A)
= E 01(4 - êt)+ E êt akt + t. (12)
1=M,L
11 The framework presented here is a generalization of the model in Hall (1988, 1990). While Hall focuses on the
estimation of markups in the absence of scale economies, the framework presented here permits a simultaneous
treatment of markups and scale economies.
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In this discussion of the empirical model, a hat above a lower case variable denotes the loga-
rithmic deviation from the reference firm of the corresponding upper-case variable. Q t and XI
represent output and input "1" (labour and materials). The subscript "t" refers to year. iL is the
markup and c is the scale elasticity of the "ordinary factors" of production (labour, materials
and ordinary capital). Ct and Kt correspond to ordinary capital (machinery and buildings)
and knowledge capital. a is the output elasticity of the firm's own knowledge capital. This
parameter reflects the opportunities for process innovation. O lt is the cost of input "1" relative
to the value of output. itt represents differences in factor productivity not accounted for by the
R&D capital variable.
3.2 Output versus deflated sales
Klette and Griliches (1992) have examined the biases that can arise in the estimation of firm-
level production models when output is proxied by deflated sales, based on a common deflator
across firms. The biases occur in situations when the firms compete in an imperfectly compet-
itive environment, where prices will reflect idiosyncratic differences in cost. This feature of the
economic environment seems a priori to be relevant to high-tech firms, operating in industries
with rapid and idiosyncratic changes in technology and product design.
Consider a demand function Qt = Q(Pe , Ke , De), where Pe , Ke and De refer to price, knowl-
edge capital and other demand shifters, respectively. A firm's knowledge capital will affect
demand through improved product quality 12 . If we take a log-linear expansion of the demand
function around the reference firm, we have
4t = rI13t +t+ dt, (13)
where now fie and kt
 are the firm's price and knowledge capital relative to the reference firm. 77
is the price elasticity of demand, while 4. is the elasticity of demand with respect to a change
in the firm's relative "product quality". The parameter e also captures the opportunities for
product innovations. dt
 is a demand shifter. From the relationship between output and sales;
st = QtPt , we have that S t = fit 4t . This relationship can be used to eliminate the unobservable
fit in equation (13) to obtain
12Another way to think about this demand system is in terms of hedonic prices. The price that matters from a
consumer's point of view is the price per quality-adjusted commodity-unit. We assume that the firm's knowledge
capital affects its product quality. Consequently, the quality-adjusted price of a firm's output relative to that of
its competitors will, cet.par., be a decreasing function of its knowledge capital relative to its competitors. See
Griliches and Mairesse (1984), Levin and Reiss (1988) and Nadiri and Bernstein (1988) for a related approach to
modeling the effect of R&D.
11
4t = 	 1 	+ 	 ‘it + 	 k
.	
(14)
77-1- 1	 ii-F1	 71-1-1 t
Profit-maximizing behavior implies that the firm uses the markup factor IL = ri/(1+ 013 . Using
this relationship, and combining (12) and (14), we get the relationship
At= E	 - êt)+ !êt + 7 1 t -	 +	 (15)
where -y = Notice that the two terms that make up the 7-parameter capture the
effect of process and product innovations. Both terms contribute positivly to the parameter, as
71 is a price elasticity which takes on negative values by definition.
Define the Solow residual:
	tEŠt
— E	 - ât)- êt-	 (16)
1=M,L
Then (15) can be rewritten
at =	 — 1) êt + -rict 	 + 	 (17)
This completes the derivation of the model of short-run producer behavior.
3.3 The accumulation of knowledge capital
As discussed in section 2, I will consider a new knowledge production function. Specifically, take
the log-linear version of (7) 14 . Since the log-linear relationship is assumed to hold for all firms,
including the reference firm, we can use the log-linear relationship in relative terms:
	kt+1 = (p — Okt + vft + íjt	 (18)
As above, a hat above a variable represents logarithmic deviations from the reference firm.
Hence, the specification suggests that a firm's knowledge capital stock tomorrow, measured
relative to the average competitor, depends on its relative capital stock from the past, as well
as the firm's relative R&D effort.
13 We assume that the number of firms are sufficiently large so that oligopolistic aspects of price setting behavior
are negligible. See e.g. Klette (1994) for price setting rules in a simple model where both product differentiation
and oligopolistic interactions are important.
14 Hall and Hayashi (1988) used a similar formulation in their analysis of R&D investment behavior.
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The specification in (18) allows for increasing (or decreasing) returns in the knowledge pro-
duction function if p is larger (smaller) than one. If (p — v) is smaller than one, the model
suggests that there is a tendency for convergence. In this case, a firm that starts with above-
average knowledge capital will gravitate towards the average firm if it carries out the average
amount of R&D. In order to stay ahead in this case, the firm has to conduct an above average
amount of R&D. If (p v) is larger than one, the model suggests a cumulative process, in which
an above-average firm will depart more and more from the average firm, even if it invests the
same amount of R&D as the average firm.
As the difference equation (18) shows, it is natural to interpret (p — v) as a depreciation rate.
It determines cet.par. the speed of evaporation of a firm's knowledge advantage (or disadvan-
tage). The (p — v) parameter depends on two basic properties of knowledge accumulation. If
there are significant scale economies in R&D, this will suggest a high value of (p — v). On the
other hand, a substantial amount of spillover and diffusion of knowledge will pull this parameter
in the opposite direction. The v-parameter alone reflects the innovative opportunities of R&D
effort.
In some industries, such as pharmaceuticals, it is unrealistic to assume a one year lag between
R&D and new profitmaking knowledge, as in (18). However, I believe that the results presented
below are not highly sensitive to the assumed lag length, since there tends to be a high degree of
autocorrelation in relative R&D effort over time (cf. the discussion in section 2). The appropriate
lag length in (18) will be a topic for future research, using data for several cross-sections of R&D
data.
ih is a stochastic term which reflects the importance of firm specific stochastic elements in the
innovation processes'. Pakes and Ericson (1989) have argued that such firm specific stochastic
elements in the knowledge accumulation (in a broad sense) represent an important aspect of
firm dynamics. A basic motivation behind the framework outlined in the present paper, is to
present a model that captures such shocks and, in particular, allows such shocks to have lasting
direct and indirect impact on a firm's performance. That is to say, the model is set up so that a
positive shock in knowledge accumulation will have a direct impact on the firm's performance.
This will be a lasting impact due to the autoregressive process for the capital stock. But there is
15 Here I will not elaborate on the extent to which such stochastic elements are due to variables that are
unobserved to us as outside observers, or to which innovation involves inherently stochastic processes (even in the
presence of complete information — whatever that means). The basic point is that even for the most complete
data sets available (today or in the near future), a substantial stochastic component will remain in our empirical
specification of the knowledge production function.
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also an indirect effect on performance of such a knowledge shock, due to the increased incentives
for R&D investment the shock may provide. This indirect effect will not be studied directly in
this paper, but is on my agenda for future research modeling the pattern of R&D investment
behavior.
The possibility of incorporating stochastic shocks in the accumulation model for knowledge
capital in a clean way is a benefit of the alternative model as compared to the standard ("perpet-
ual inventory") model. As we shall see below, my alternative model allows a simple elimination
of the knowledge capital stock. This is desirable as stochastic shocks will make it impossible to
construct an unbiased measure of the relevant knowledge variable 16 .
3.4 The "not-so-fixed effect" model
Define the quasi-difference operator;	 = 1 — (p — v)L, where L is the lag-operator. If we
apply this operator to equation (17), and eliminate the unobservable knowledge capital stock
by equation (18), we obtain
= (c /ps — 1) iiêit + 7v
	 + ait.	 (19)
Here I have introduced a subscript "i" to denote the plant under consideration. The subscript
/ refers to the line-of-business, within the firm to which the plant belongs. For a single-plant
firm, the two subscripts "i" and "/" will refer to the same unit of observation, but for multi-
plant firms this may not be the case. If a firm operates several plants within a line-of-business,
this model assumes that they all have access to the same knowledge capital stock, apart from
random noise buried in the residual. Implicitly, this formulation assumes the presence of scale
economies in the utilization of knowledge capital. Such scale economies are analytically distinct
from economies of scale in the production of knowledge capital, i.e. the scale economies in
the G(Kt , Rt)-function. This distinction was emphasized by Fisher and Temin (1973). The
residual (eit) captures the error term from the model of short-run producer behavior. Due to
the quasi-difference operation, the error term will have a first-order moving-average structure if
the untransformed residuals, (the and åt in (15)), are uncorrelated over time. êi t will also
contain the error component from the knowledge production function (í3).
Equation (19) can be spelled out more completely:
16 111 the standard model, the problem is that we need the log of the capital stock, and it is this logtransformation
that makes it impossible to create an unbiased measure of the required capital variable (i.e. the log of the capital
stock).
14
ait = (p - + 1 — 1Yei t — (p — v)(cht — 1)6i,t—i + 7vI,ti + kit. (20)
This is the equation that has been estimated in this study. The model contains the standard
fixed-effect model as a special case (p —v
 = 1, chz = 1), if we disregard the way R&D investment
enters the model. More generally, (20) portrays a model of plant (and firm) dynamics in which
there are persistent differences in performance between plants, but not quite as persistent as in
the fixed effect case, at least not if the leading firms do not continue their above average effort
in R&D. Hence, one might label this model "a not-so-fixed effect model".
4 Variable construction and the data
The regressions are carried out on observations dated 1989 and 1990 for Norwegian manufac-
turing. There are 804 plants in the sample from 3 (2-digit) industries: Chemicals (ISIC 35),
Metals (ISIC 37) and Machinery and equipment (ISIC 38). These industries carry out by far the
largest share of R&D among the Norwegian manufacturing industries (about 94 percent of total
manufacturing R&D). They also have the highest R&D intensities 17. See table 1 for summary
statistics on R&D in Norwegian manufacturing. Production data have been taken from the
Manufacturing Time Series files, which contain the needed variables at the plant level (see ap-
pendix B for details), as well as the plant's company affiliation. We have eliminated plants with
extreme value added per unit of labour or capital's. hi addition to the observations entering the
regression, the data set also contains additional lagged observations for the production variables,
which are used as instruments 19 . Table 2 reports some summary statistics for the sample.
The R&D data have been taken from the Norwegian R&D survey in 1989, carried out by The
Royal Norwegian Council for Research and Technology (NTNF). This survey is close to a census
for all firms with more than 20 employees in the industries we consider. For firms with less than
20 employees, the coverage is less certain. Consequently, we have eliminated firms with less than
20 employees from our sample. The R&D data have been matched (manually) by company name
and addresses 20 . The R&D data from 1989 have the great benefit, for our purpose, of containing
information about whether the firm belongs to an interlocking group of firms. An interlocking
group of firms is characterized by a parent-company owning and all subsidiaries in which the
17See Naas (1993) for an analysis of the pattern in R&D spending across industries and over the period 1985-89
(in Norwegian).
18 "Extreme values" means more than 300 percent away from the median value within each 3-digit industry.
19Such lagged observations are easily available for the production statistics, but not for the R&D variables.
2o1
 am grateful to G. Frengen and other people in Statistics Norway who helped me with this task.
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parent owns a majority of equity. For firms belonging to an interlocking group (from now on
often referred to only as "group"), the file provides an identification code for the group. The
use of this information will be described in the next section. Another attractive aspect of this
data source is that the file reports R&D disaggregated by line of business within each firm. The
majority of firms report R&D in only one line of business; such a breakdown by line-of-business
is still informative for firms that produce in several lines-of-business, as this breakdown helps us
to identify the target line-of-business for the R&D activity.
The labour costs in the production data have been adjusted for R&D labour costs to avoid
double counting. All production data are measured as deviations from (3-digit ISIC-code)
industry-time average values.
4.1 The R&D variables and the search for spillovers
The degree of detail in the data allow us to address a number of issues by examining the impact
of various R&D variables. The basic R&D variable refers to the amount of R&D done within
the line-of-business within the firm to which the plant belongs 21 . Beyond this R&D variable, I
have also considered other variables that possibly reflect the impact of R&D activities in other
parts of the firm as well as the group. See figure 1, which illustrates the use of these variables.
One set of regressions will consider the impact of R&D in other lines-of-business within the firm
on the performance of a plant (cf. the impact of R&D in LB 37 in firm A, on plant 1). Another
set of regressions will examine the impact of R&D carried out in other firms within the group
(cf. LB 35 or LB 381 in firm B). The alternatives considered and their interpretations will be
discussed in more detail when I present the regression results.
In our data set there are a number of firms that report no R&D. This causes our model
to collapse for these observations, a problem well-recognized by researchers in this field. The
standard interpretation of these zeros is that they reflect a censoring problem, and that all firms
have some knowledge capital and are doing some new knowledge acquisition, but not necessarily
in the form of formal R&D. I have used the standard fix-up for this problem by setting the
log of the R&D variable equal to zero and adding a dummy variable that takes the value one
for these firms, and zero otherwise. The interpretation of the dummy-coefficent is as the log
of the average amount of knowledge acquisition for these firms, measured in R&D terms. We
would expect these firms to do on average less knowledge acquisition than the R&D performing
21 1
 am grateful to S.E. Forre who helped me with a detailed examination of possible errors in the industry
classification of the reported R&D activities.
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firms, which, since variables are measured relative to the average plant, translates to a negative
coefficient for this dummy. An obvious alternative to this procedure is to restrict the sample
to plants belonging to R&D performing firms. Experiments with this subsaraple gave similar
parameter estimates, but less precision, as expected. Hence, the results below will be based on
the more informative complete sample.
4.2 Some additional regressors
The basic model in equation (20) has been augmented in several ways. I have added a set of
dummy variables that reflect the three different types of plants considered in these industries,
"sole facilities in a single-plant firm", "parent facilities in a multi-plant firm" and "subsidiary
facilities in a multi-plant firm". The motivation for introducing these dummies is that these
types of plants may appear to converge to different average performance measures as they carry
out different amounts of overhead activities. The regressions also contain dummy variables
that reflect whether the firm is foreign-owned or not, and within two alternative intervals (20-
50 percent vs. more than 50 percent foreign ownership) 22 . Industry dummies have not been
introduced as all variables are measured relative to their time-industry means.
5 Econometric issues
Equation (20) can not be estimated directly by OLS, as the model contains a lagged dependent
variable, and the error term is autoregressive of (at least) the MA(1)-form by construction23. The
estimation is instead carried out by GMM24 . The preferred regression is based on an instrument
set consisting of capital and the number of employees dated t-1 and earlier, output dated t-2
and earlier, as well as the Solow residual dated t-3. The R&D variable is not instrumented,
as it is assumed to be determined before the knowledge shock (and the performance shock) is
revealed. I will present both formal overidentification tests and estimates based on alternative
instrument sets below.
As the model is written in (20), there are some cross coefficient restrictions that appear to
provide a means for specification testing, and more efficient estimation of the primary parameters
of the model. However, one should notice that if the ratio between the scale elasticity and the
markup (cf. chu) changes between periods, this cross-coefficient restriction disappears.
22See Simpson (1994) for a study of the importance of foreign ownership using a larger set of the same data.
23See Griliches (1961).
24 See Hansen (1982). GMM in my case, with only cross-sectional variations, is equivalent to the 2SIV-estimator
suggested by White (1982).
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6 The results
6.1 The basic model
Table 3 reports the basic results. The first column reports the preferred regression. The lagged
dependent variable enters with a highly significant coefficient not very far from one. This result
is consistent with the observation that productivity differences are highly persistent. However,
the coefficient is significantly below one, and suggests a depreciation rate around 0.2 . The two
capital variables have coefficents that are not significantly different from zero, which suggests
that the scale coefficient and the markup are of similar magnitude (but not necessarily one!). The
coefficient of R&D investment is highly significant and has the expected sign. The interpretation
of the magnitude of this coefficient will be presented in the next section. The "No-R&D"-dummy
is also highly significant. This estimate suggests that plants belonging to the "No-R&D"-firms
tend to have a performance measure (Solow residual) 2.5 percent below the average. The "type
of plant" dummies are not reported, but are highly significant. A joint test of both the R&D
variable and the No-R&D dummy is reported under the horizontal line.
The GMM overidentification test, suggested by Hansen (1982), does not indicate that the
model is misspecified. However, rather than relying entirely on the overidentification test as an
omnibus specification test, I have examined a series of a priori interesting alternative specifica-
tions 25 . Column 2 reveals that nothing of substance hinges on the use of the GMM-estimator
as compared to the 2SLS estimator. Column 3 demonstrates that even though the "type of
plant" dummies are highly significant, dropping them does not seriously affect the parameters
of interest. If we drop the dependent variable lagged three times as an instrument, the coefficent
of the lagged dependent variable increases, while the coefficent of the R&D variables decreases.
However, none of these changes results in coefficents outside the confidence interval of the pre-
ferred regression26 . When I drop the lagged dependent variable as an instrument, I still find
the R&D coefficients to be significant at standard significance levels. Adding the dependent
variable lagged two times as an extra instrument, causes the overidentification test to reject, as
reported in column 5. The last column shows what happens if we add industry dummies to the
regression. As argued above, industry effects have been incorporated in one sense, as all vari-
25Cf. Newey (1985) for a discussion of the limitations of the GMM overidentification test as an omnibus
specification test.
26A formal Hausman test on the other hand would dearly reject the first model. But as pointed out by Arellano
and Bond (1991) among others, the Hausman-test based on (2-step) GMM-estimates has a serious tendency to
overreject.
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ables (sales, labour, materials etc.) are measured relative to their time-industry means. Though
the R&D coefficient is insensitive to this change, other parameters are less so. In particular, the
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable increases, both the capital coefficients turn highly
significant, and the No-R&D dummy disappears. This pattern suggests at least two avenues
for extending the model. One is to allow the scale/markup-ratios to differ across industries.
The other is to let the coefficient of the No-R&D dummy to differ across industries, reflecting
differences in their censoring levels. Experiments along these lines suggested that the model
in this case is over-parameterized and not identifiable from the available sample. However, the
R&D coefficient remained stable and significant in most of these regressions. The bottom line
is that the preferred regression in column 1 seems reasonably stable across a set of alternative
specifications. After presenting an interpretation of the magnitude of the R&D coefficient, the
rest of the paper will present more regressions that extend this preferred specification of the
model.
6.2 Interpreting the magnitude of the coefficients
In appendix C, I have shown that, for the model presented in section 3, the marginal (nominal)





 and Sit denote the firm's profit and sales. Using the envelope theorem, and the fact
that the (stochastic) Bellman equation27 should hold for all values of the knowledge capital,
yields
OGit171(Kit) =	 PEit	 (22)
where the
 Gt-function now also captures the random component, in order to be consistent
with the empirical model. EitH is the expectation operator that conditions on the information
available to firm i at time t. The first order condition for R&D investment can be written
OGit 
wit = ßEit[V(Ki,t+i) oRit i (23)
Combining (21), (22) and (23), we find




Vi(Kit )Ki 	(p - 1/) witRit +  	 (24)
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In deriving (24), I used the log-linear functional form of the knowledge production function
applied in the empirical section of this paper 28 . Unfortunately, I am not able to identify p,v
and 7 separately in my regressions. But if we are willing to assume constant returns to. scale
in the knowledge production function, then it is easy to identify the parameters we need to
evaluate (24) for our firms. Notice that constant returns to scale in knowledge production
is a maintained hypothesis in the standard model (1). With constant returns to scale in the
knowledge production function, the estimates in the first column in table 3 imply v 0.2, and
7 = 0.0729 . That is to say, the value of the knowledge capital stock relative to a firm's sales is
close to 0.07 for firms with very low (but positive) R&D intensities. The more R&D intensive
firms have a substantially higher ratio, seen in the estimate of 4 for the slope coefficent of the last
term in (24). Using the sample mean R&D intensity for all R&D performing plants suggests
an average knowledge capital intensity around 0.51 . Electrical equipment (ISIC 383) alone,
which is the most R&D intensive industry, has a mean knowledge capital to sales ratio of 1.12
. However, the large spreads in the observed R&D intensities across my sample suggest large
variations in the knowledge-capital to sales ratio.
6.3 Spillovers within group
Table 4 reports the regression results for my exploration of spillovers across plants that share a
line-of-business, and belong to the same interlocking group of firms. Referring to figure 1, this set
of regressions examines whether only the R&D in LB 35 within firm A affects the performance
of plant 1, or whether the R&D within LB 35 within firm B also matters. In this analysis I am
limiting the focus to spillovers to remain inside a given line-of-business within the group. The
first column reports a regression in which we directly try to identify whether it is the R&D within
the firm or the R&D within the group that affects a plant's performance. The iedntification is
obtained by a regression that includes both the firm-LB and the group-LB R&D variables. To
reduce the mulitcollineratiy problem, the variables are redefined as the firm-LB R&D variable,
as against the difference between the firm-LB and the group-LB R&D variable. The results
clearly suggest that it is the R&D within the firm rather than the group that matters. In fact,
281.e. Ki,t+i = VitKft—v R, where Vi t is a mean one, random component.
29 v is given as 1 (the assumed value for p) minus the coefficient in front the lagged Solow residual, while 7 is
the coefficient in front of R&D divided by our v-estimate.
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the regression seems to attach no weight to R&D effort outside the firm. To push this result a
bit further, an alternative line of inquiry has been pursued in the next two columns. Column 2
uses within-firm (and within LB) R&D as the basic R&D variable, but adds to the regression
a dummy that is one if there is R&D activity outside the firm but within its group-LB, and
zero otherwise30 . There are 53 observations with a non-zero dummy variable of this kind. The
coefficient on the dummy variable is significant and suggests the presence of positive spillovers.
The last column introduces an additional dummy variable that is similar to the dummy variable
employed in the column 2 regression, but now with a threshold at 50 mill. Nkr rather than
zero. 20 of the 53 observations with non-zero dummy in column 2 exceed this threshold 31 . The
outcome of this regression clearly suggests that there is an identifiable, positive effect associated
with this second dummy. That is to say, there seem to be strong spillovers across firms within
a group and a given line of business, if the R&D effort is of a sufficient magnitude. A natural
interpretation of this finding is that some of the groups have a central R&D laboratory that
create innovations benefiting the whole group and not only the firm to which the laboratory
belongs.
6.4 Economies of scope
The last set of results presented in table 5 consider spillovers across lines-of-business within
the firm as well as within the group. I will label such spillovers economies of scope in R&D (in
accordance with the definition in Panzar and Willig, 1981). As in the previous set of regressions,
the approach is to introduce a set of dummy variables. The first column indicates that there is
a positive, but insignificant, effect of R&D effort in other lines-of-business within the firm. The
dummy variable that yields us this result is defined as one if there is some R&D activity in other
lines-of-business within the firm. The lack of precision is not surprising as my sample has only
12 observations with non-zero dummy values in this case.
The next two columns consider economies of scope in R&D not only within the firm, but
within the group. The second column shows the outcome when a dummy is introduced that
is positive if the group undertakes R&D beyond the 5 mill. Nkr threshold and zero otherwise.
The coefficient is of similar magnitude to the previous coefficient, and is estimated with more
precision. The increased precision reflects a larger number of non-zero observations for this
30 Cf. figure 1: If there is R&D activity in firm B, within LB 35, the dummy for plant 1 equals one.
-31 To reduce the multicollinearity problem between the two dummies I and II, the first dummy variable is set
to zero when the second is one. This affects the interpretation of the coefficient of the second dummy.
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dummy (72) in this regression. The last column suggests that the more R&D carried out in the
other firms within the group, the larger is the benefit, as one might expect'.
7 Concluding remarks and future research
The relationship between R&D and performance has been addressed with a new framework in
this paper. This framework not only provides a new interpretation of well-established correla-
tions in firm-level data; it also has allowed us to consider some new relationships. The empirical
performance of the model is encouraging as it is able to capture and identify several phenomena
of interest. The following substantial empirical findings have emerged from this study:
• R&D is a significant explanatory variable for performance at the firm (and plant) level.
• Non-R&D performing firms have, on average, a 2.5 percent lower performance measure
(Solow residual) than the average of all firms.
• The rate of depreciation of the appropriable part of knowledge capital is estimated to be
about
 0.2.
• There are visible (and significant) spillover effects of R&D across firms operating in the
same line of business, and which belong to the same interlocking group.
• I also find some evidence suggesting that there are economies of scope in R&D across
lines-of-business within a firm. Similar scope economies also seem to be working across
firms that belong to the same interlocking group of firms.
The results presented in this paper are based on a short panel of observations. Most of the
basic results presented above could be examined on longer panels and much larger data sets that
are already available in many countries. I intend to pursue such research in the near future.
Other results related to scope economies and spillovers require R&D disaggregated in a detail
not often seen in other data sources. But the results presented in this paper hopefully encourage
other researchers to search for rich data sets that could be used to address similar issues.
The model of knowledge accumulation presented in this paper has some interesting impli-
cations for the correlation in R&D investment over time, as well as cross equation correlations
32 Regressions in which we pooled the information used in table 4 and 5 have been done; these regressions
merged all the R&D undertaken outside the line-of-business for the plant under consideration. The results were
similar to those reported in the last two columns in table 5.
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in the error terms in the performance model (presented in this paper) and an R&D investment
model. I intend to examine this pattern in future research in order to more conclusively discrimi-
nate between the standard model and the alternative presented here. Perhaps such an extension
of the analysis will enable us to estimate the p-parameter, which captures the magnitude of scale
economies in knowledge production. As recent research in growth theory has pointed out, iden-
tifying such a phenomenon could be important for understanding economic growth at various
levels of the economy.
23
References:
Arellano, M. and S.R. Bond (1991): Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte
Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations. Review of Economic Stud-
ies 58, 277-97.
Bernstein, J.I. and M.I. Nadiri (1988): Research and Development and Intra-industry Spillovers:
An Empirical Application of Dynamic Duality. Review of Economic Studies 56, 249-69.
Bound, J., C. Cummins, Z. Griliches, B.H. Hall and A. Jaffe (1984): Who Does R&D
and Who Patents? In Z. Griliches (ed.): R&D, Patents and Productivity, Chicago Univer-
sity Press (Chicago).
Diewert, E. (1976): Exact and Superlative Index Numbers. Journal of Econometrics 4, 115-
45.
Fisher, F.M. and P. Temin (1973): Returns to Scale in Research and Development: What
Does the Schumpeterian Hypotheses Imply? Journal of Political Economy 81, 56-70.
Griliches, Z. (1961): A Note on the Serial Correlation Bias in Estimates of Distributed Lags.
Econometrica 29, 65-.
Griliches, Z. (1979): Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and Development to
Productivity Growth. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 92-116.
Griliches, Z. (1986): Productivity, R&D, and Basic Research at the Firm Level in the 1970's.
American Economic Review 76, 141-54.
Griliches, Z. (1992): The Search for R&D Spillovers. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 94
(Supplement), 29-47.
Griliches, Z. and J. Mairesse (1984): Productivity and R&D at the Firm Level. In Z.
Griliches (ed.): R&D, Patents and Productivity, Chicago University Press (Chicago).
Hall, B.H. and F. Hayashi (1989): Research and Development as an Investment. NBER
Working paper no. 2973.
Hall, B.H. and J. Mairesse (1992): Exploring the Relationship between R&D and Produc-
tivity in French Manufacturing Firms. NBER Working Paper No. 3956.
Hall, B.H., Z. Griliches and LA. Hausman (1986): Patents and R&D: Is There A Lag?
International Economic Review 27, 265-83.
Hall, R.E. (1988): The Relationship between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry. Jour-
nal of Political Economy 96, 921-47.
Hall, R.E. (1990): Invariance Properties of Solow's Productivity Residual. in P. Diamond
(ed): Growth, Productivity, Unemployment. MIT Press (Cambridge, U.S.).
Halvorsen, R. , R. Jensen and F.Foyn (1991): Dokumentasjon av Industristatistikkens Tidsseriebase
("Documentation of the Panel Data Base for Manufacturing"). Mimeo, Statistics Norway.
(In Norwegian).
24
'Hansen, L.P. (1982): Large Sample Properties of a Generalized Methods of Moments. Econo-
rnetrica 50, 1029-54.
Jaffe, A. (1986): Technological Opportunity and Spillovers from R&D. American Economic
Review 76, 984-1001.
Jovanovic, B. (1993): The Diversification of Production. Brookings Papers: Microeconomics
1993, 197-235.
Klette, T.J. (1992): On the Relationship between R&D and Performance when Innovative
Opportunities Differ between Firms. Paper presented at the NBER Summer Institute
1992.
Klette, T.J. (1993): Is Price Equal to Marginal Costs? An Integrated Study of Price-Cost
Margins and Scale Economies among Norwegian Manufacturing Establishments. Discus-
sion Paper no. 93, Statistics Norway.
Klette, T.J. (1994): Strategic Trade Policy for Exporting Industries: More General Results in
the Oligopolistic Case. Oxford Economic Papers 46, 296-310.
Levin, R.C. and P.C. Reiss (1989): Cost-Reducing and Demand-Creating R&D with Spillovers.
Rand Journal of Economics 20.
Lucas, R.E. (1993): Making a Miracle. Econometrica 61, 251-72.
Mairesse, J. and M. Sassenou (1991): R&D and Productivity: A Survey of Econometric
Studies at the Firm Level. STI Review no. 8, OECD (Paris).
Mundlak, Y. (1961): Empirical Production Functions Free of Management Bias. Journal of
Farm Economics 43, 44-56.
Mundlak, Y. and I. Hoch (1965): Consequences of Alternative Specifications of Cobb-Douglas
Production Functions. Econometrica 33, 814-28.
Naas, S.O. (1992): Hva Skyldes Fallet i Næringslivets FoU fra 1987 til 1989? Fremtek-notat
2/92, Future-Oriented Technology Policy (Oslo).
Nelson, R.R. (1988): Modelling the Connections in the Cross Section between Technical
Progress and R&D Intensity. Rand Journal of Economics 19, 478-85.
Newey, W.K. (1985): Generalized Methods of Moments Specification Testing. Journal of
Econometrics 29, 229-56.
Pakes, A. and M. Schankerman (1984): An Exploration into the Determinants of Research
Intensity. In Z. Griliches (ed.): NO, Patents and Productivity, Chicago University Press
(Chicago).
Pakes, A. and R. Ericson (1989): Empirical Implications of Alternative Models of Firm Dy-
namics. NBER Working Paper no. 2893.
Panzar, J.C. and R.D. Willig (1981): Economies of Scope, American Economic Review 71,
268-72.
Penrose, E.T. (1959): The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Basil Blackwell (Oxford).
25
Romer, P.M. (1990): Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of Political Economy 98,
S71-S102.
Simpson, M. (1994): Foreign Control and Norwegian Manufacturing Performance. Discussion
Paper no. 111, Statistics Norway.
Stokey, N.L. (1988): Learning by Doing and the Introduction of New Goods. Journal of
Political Economy 96, 701-17.
Stokey, N.L. and R.E. Lucas (1989): Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics. Harvard
University Press (Cambridge, U.S.).
Uzawa, H. (1968): Time Preference and the Penrose Effect in a Two-Class Model of Economic
Growth. Journal of Political Economy 77, 628-52.
White, H. (1982): Instrumental Variable Estimation with Independent Observations. Econo-
metrica 50, 483-99.
Young, A. (1991): Learning by Doing and the Dynamic Effects of International Trade. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 106, 369-406.
26
Appendix A: The model of producer behavior
The starting point of this analysis is a differentiable production function for a technology with
one output and a number of inputs33 . Let us denote the production function as Q t = F(X),
where Xt denotes the vectors of inputs and Q t is output. Assume that the production function
can be assumed to be a second order polynomial in log of the inputs, such as for the general
translog production function. We do not assume constant returns to scale or a homothetic
technology. Diewert (1976) has proved that in this case, for any two input-output vectors;
(Qot, Xot) and (Qt, Xt):
(25)
iEN
where we use the notation that a hat above a variable represents the logarithmic changes, e.g.
4t = ln(QtNot) etc., and
_ 1 (  .X4t  OF(Xot ) 	 OF(X))
a, —
2 F(Xot) OX	 F(X) OX1 	 (26)
In our case the two input-output vectors will refer to two different plants in the same industry.
That is to say, î will denote the percentage difference of input "1" between the plant in focus
and a reference plant for a given year (t). N is the set of inputs. alt is the average output
elasticity of input 1, where the average is constructed on the basis of the plant in consideration
and the reference plant.
Under profit maximization, the marginal revenue product of an input is equal to marginal
cost for a fully adjustable factor of production. Let us assume that the firm determines inputs,
considering input prices to be fixed34 . It follows that
XI  OF(X)	 Wt1X1
= 1, 2	 (27)F(X) OX1	 (1111)PtQt
where fe is the ratio between price and marginal revenue (= marginal costs), while WI and Pt
are the prices of input i and the output. Combining (26) and (27), we have that the output
elasticity for an adjustable input is
33This section borrows heavily from Klette (1993).
34This is dearly the case with standard price taking behavior. It is also true with a bargaining model where the
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where 91 is the average cost share of input t for the reference plant and the plant in focus.
Various kinds of rigidities, input lags and expectational errors make it dubious to impute
the marginal product of capital from observed prices on new equipment, interest rates etc. In
productivity analysis of a competitive industry with constant returns to scale, this problem is
dealt with by estimating the shadow price, and thereby the (shadow) elasticity of capital, as a
residual. The case with imperfect competition and non-constant returns is almost as simple if
we assume that we know - or can estimate - the overall scale elasticity to all factors. Denote this
scale elasticity as 77. Then we have that the output elasticity of capital (ct ) , obeys the following
relationships
(29)
The last equality follows from (28).
Using the expressions in (28) and (29), equation (25) can be rewritten
-4t = E	 -	 or. 	 (30)
iEN
The empirical model
In our case, the explicit regression equation corresponding to the model derived above can be
stated:
= P E	 êt)) + rìê + akt + /Alt. 	 (31)
1=M,L,
The left hand side variable measures relative differences in output, while the right hand side
variables refer to labour (L), materials (M) and capital (C). The subscript 't' refers to year. All
relative differences refer to changes from the reference plant. This plant has been constructed as
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an average of the plants with TFP measures belonging to the 45 to 55 percentiles for each year
and (2.5-digit) industry. E.g. the cost share for each input for the reference plant is computed
as the as the average for these plants, while each of the inputs is given by their geometric mean.
We have added a term; akt , which captures the productivity differences, due to the divergence in
the knowledge capital between the plant under consideration and the reference plant. fit reflects
other sources of productivity differences.
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Appendix B: Sample and variable construction
One of the data sources used in this analysis is the manufacturing census carried out annually
by The Division of Manufacturing Statistics in Statistics Norway. A detailed description of the
data set is provided by Halvorsen et.al. (1991).
The output measure is gross output adjusted for duties and subsidies. Labour inputs are
represented by man hours. Price deflators for gross production (at seller prices), materials and
capital (at buyer prices) are taken from the Norwegian National Accounts. Wage payments
comprise salaries and wages in cash and kind, other benefits for the employees, taxes and social
expenses levied by law. The capital input variable employed is based on investment figures
and the total reported fire insurance value for buildings and machinery. An examination of
the fire insurance values and a comparison with the investment figures reveal much noise in
the fire insurance values. Hence, we have constructed a simple filter to pool the two sources of
information about movements in the capital stock. Using the perpetual inventory method35 , we
have constructed three different estimates of the capital (Cit ) on the basis of observations for
fire insurance values and investment figures for the years t, t-1 and t+1. The final estimates of
the capital value for each year is obtained by taking the mean value of three different estimates.
The empirical model assumes that it is the capital stock at the beginning of the year which
determines the flow of capital services in that year.
The data source for the R&D data is the R&D survey carried out by the Royal Norwegian
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (NTNF) in 1989. Aggregate R&D statistics based
on the R&D survey are published in several publications from NTNF. An analysis of the pattern
in the aggregate data across industries and the years 1985-90 is given by Naas (1993). The R&D
data is reported separately for each line of business within each company. According to NTNF,
the R&D survey should be close to a census for companies with more than 20 employees. For
smaller companies the sampling is more selective. To reduce the problem of sample selection
bias, I have chosen to truncate the sample. That is to say, only companies with at least 20
employees were included in the sample
351.e. using the formula
Cit = C1 , t _ 1 (1 — b) 0.5(I 4-	 .
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Appendix C: The shadow price of R&D capital
For a firm with knowledge capital stock Kt , short run profit is given by
rt(Kt) = PiQt — C(Qt, I(s)
	
(32)
What is the increase in short run profits when we alter Kt? That is, we want to express the
derivative of this expression with respect to Kt
dirt
	dPtp aQt dPt p
 aQt
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The first, second and forth term on the right hand side add to zero, given that the firm maximizes
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The first equality follows from the firm's markup rule, while the second follows from the prop-
erties of the demand system (cf. equation (13)). We have defined a and c as the output
elasticities of the firm's transformation function with respect to knowledge capital and ordinary


















The last equality follows from the relationship CO = Ehz Pt Q t, which can be derived from
the definition of scale economies (from the cost side), and the firm's markup rule. Combining
equations (34) and (36)
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PLANT 1 PLANT 2 PLANT 3
Figure 1: The relationship between "interlocking group", "firm", "line-of-business" and "plant"
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Table 1: Summary statistics on the R&D variables. 1989
R&D-intensity	 R&D-expenditures*
R&D-	 Non-R&D-	 Inter quart.	 Inter quart.
plants	 plants	 Mean	 Median	 range	 Median	 range
All industries	 196	 608	 0.111	 0.042	 0.097	 2.7	 7.7
El. equipment	 40	 53	 0.262	 0.249	 0.257	 3.4	 9.0





Table 2: Summary statistics for the production variables. 1990. Mean values, standard deviations in
parentheses.
Value added	 Capital	 Labour	 Material
Employment	 per employee*	 intensity	 share
	 share	 Obs.
All plants	 106	 287	 2.89	 0.349	 0.559	 804
	
(168)	 (152)	 (4.37)	 (.182)	 (.165)
Non-R&D-plants	 73	 254	 2.76	 0.379	 0.543	 608
	
(97)	 (102)	 (4.81)	 (.186)	 (.170)







Table 3: Basic regressions. GMM-estimates. Dependent variable: Solow residual.
Drop lag.	 Include	 Add ind.
Basic results	 2SLS4)	 No dummies	 dep. var.as IV	 extra IV	 dummies
Solow residual., 	 0.800***	 0.786***	 0.808***	 0.862***	 0.870***	 0.909***
(.046)	 (.038)	 (.046)	 (.053)	 (.039)	 (.049)
Capital	 0.036	 0.041	 0.038	 0.031	 0.005	 -0.140***
(.032)	 (.032)	 (.032)	 (.033)	 (.029)	 (.036)
Capital.,	 -0.037	 -0.042	 -0.039*	 -0.033	 -0.006	 0.133***
(.031)	 (.030)	 (.030)	 (.031)	 (.028)	 (.035)
R&D.,	 0.014 	 0.011'	 0.012***	 0.009**	 0.010'	 0.011***
(.004)	 (.005)	 (.004)	 (.005)	 (.004)	 (.005)
"No R&D.," dummy	 -0.025 	 0.026 	-0.021** 	-0.016
(.011)	 (.012)	 (.011)	 (.011)	 (.010)	 (.009)
Type of plane ) 	X***	 X***	 X***	 X***	 X***t,)
cn
R&D-effects2) 	13.76 	9.87*** 	6.49 	6.26**
	
(2)	 (2)	 (2)	 (2)	 (2)	 (2)
Overident. test3) 	9.96	 -	 9.60	 2.40	 15.17**	 12.21*
	
(6)	 (6)	 (5)	 (7)	 (6)
RMSE	 0.110	 0.110	 0.111	 0.112	 0.111	 0.112
Obs.	 804	 804	 804	 804	 804	 804
Footnotes:
Robus standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1 percent level
** Significant at 5 percent level
Significant at 10 percent level
1) Regression includes dummies for plant type and foreign ownership
2) Chi-square test of the joint significance of the R&D variables (DOF in parentheses)
3) Hansen's (1982) overidentification test (DOF in parentheses)
4) Standard errors are not robust to heteroskedasticity
Table 4: Spillovers across firms within group. GMM-estimates.
Dependent variable: Solow residual.












(R&DGLB_ i-R&DLB_ i) 2) 	0.002
(.008)
"No R&Du_ i " dummy	 -0.025***	 -0.018**	 -0.019**
(.011)	 (.010)	 (.011)
Dummy I for R&DGL3_1 3)
	0.029**	 0.002
(.017)	 (.019)













	 0.110	 0.110	 0.110
Obs.	 804	 804	 804
Footnotes:
Robus standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1 percent level
** Significant at 5 percent level
Significant at 10 percent level
1) R&D at the line of buisness level
2) Difference between R&D at group versus firm level
3) Dummy equal to one if there is positive R&D outside firm, but within groups and the same line of
business.
4) Dummy equal to one if R&D outside firm, but within group exceeds 50 Mill. Nkr.
5) Regression includes dummies for plant type and foreign ownership
6) Chi-square test of the joint significance of the R&D variables (DOF in parentheses)
7) Hansen's (1982) overidentification test (DOF in parentheses)
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Table 5: Economies of scope in R&D. GIVIM-estimates. Dependent
variable: Solow residual.
Economies of	 Economies of	 Economies of
scope within	 scope within	 scope within
firm	 group I	 group II
Solow residual_ i
	0.799***	 0.800***	 0.799*** .
(.047)	 (.046)	 (.047)







	0.012***	 0.011 	 0.010**
(.005)	 (.004)	 (.004)
"No R&DLB_ i " dummy	 -0.024 	 -0.015*
(.011)	 (.010)	 (.010)
Dummy for R&D_ i 2)
	0.031
(.026)
Dummy I for R&D_ i 3)
	0.033**	 0.024*
(.016)	 (.016)















RMSE	 0.110	 0.110	 0.110
Obs.	 804	 804	 804
Footnotes:
Robus standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1 percent level
** Significant at 5 percent level
Significant at 10 percent level
1) R&D at the line of buisness level
2) Dummy equal to one if R&D in other lines of buisness within firm is positive
3) Dummy equal to one if R&D in other lines of buisness within group exceeds 5 Mill. Nkr.
4) Dummy equal to one if R&D in other lines of buisness within group exceeds 50 Mill. Nkr.
5) Regression includes dummies for plant type and foreign ownership
6) Chi-square test of the joint significance of the R&D variables (DOF in parentheses)
7) Hansen's (1982) overidentification test (DOF in parentheses)
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